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School of Law

BOOK REVIEW
Government by Judiciary, by Raoul Berger: Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, 418 pages.
Reviewed by Richard S. Kay*
The storm of criticism over Government by Judiciary by Raoul
Berger has already begun.' Well it might, for Berger draws into

question vitually the entire case law of the fourteenth amendment. In
particular he condemns as usurpations the Supreme Court's decisions

declaring racial segregation unconstitutional 2 and those requiring the
reapportionment of legislatures under the formula of one person-one
3
vote.
These doctrines have now become almost second nature to a

generation of lawyers and scholars. Thus, it is hardly surprising that
the casting of a fundamental doubt on such basic assumptions should
produce shock, dismay, and sometimes anger.

Berger's argument, briefly stated, is that the fourteenth amendment4 was intended by those who wrote and ratified it to accomplish
rather limited objectives. The amendment was intended by the framers and understood by their contemporaries merely to "constitu-

tionalize" the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The act had in ex7press terms
prohibited discrimination by the states on the basis of race with re-

spect to a finite list of legal rights and powers: "[T]o make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, pur* Mr. Kay is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of
Law.
1. See Brest, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, § 7 (Book Review), at 10;
Burleigh, Book Review, 49 PUB. INrTEREST 151 (1977).
2. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
4. The critical section is the first:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,§ 1.
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chase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, and [to be] subject to like punishment."' S
Berger asserts that it was these rights and no others which were
protected against state infringement by the fourteenth amendment. It
assured civil equality-that is, equality in the legal relationships
among people. This was in common understanding clearly distinguished from political equality in the relations between individuals
and the state, which might have guaranteed the right to vote on a
nondiscriminatory basis. 6 Social equality, which might have barred
separate treatment in education and other public facilities, was simi7
larly distinguishable.
The triad of guarantees in section one of the amendment are,
Berger contends, all understandable within this framework of limited
concerns. The civil rights themselves are secured in the prohibition
against abridging "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States" (this being a constitutional shorthand for the enumeration in the Civil Rights Act). State legislation discriminating with respect to the exercise of those rights (and those rights only) was prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, and access to the courts on an
impartial basis to vindicate those rights was provided by the Due
Process Clause. 8
To support this interpretation, Berger, in the great bulk of the
book, puts forward a detailed examination of the deliberations of the
39th Congress which proposed the fourteenth amendment. The determination of legislative intention is always tricky 9 and in the case of
constitutional amendments the difficulty is multiplied by the need to
account for the ratification process as well. Nonetheless, one cannot
help but be impressed by the volume and weight of Berger's evidence. I am not prepared or inclined to undertake the kind of historical verification necessary to decide whether his interpretation is cor5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970)), reprinted in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY at 24 (1977).
6. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 24. The distinction between civil and political rights
was at least recognized by the turn of the century. See H. BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMEIUCAN CONsrrrtrrIONAL LAw § 198 (3d ed. 1910); 11 C.J. Civil Rights § 1 (1917).
7. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 27-29. It was this view-that the amendment did not
touch the intangible degradation of state-imposed segregation-that underlay the Court's
decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For a more expansive discussion of
the same theme see People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y.. 438, 445-53 (1883).
8. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 211-13.
9. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930).
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rect. While serious questions remain' 0 it seems that the burden of
proof has at least shifted to those who would impute a more expansive scope to the framers' intentions. The moral and political values
advanced by the desegregation and one person-one vote decisions
provide for me powerful reasons for hoping that the burden will be
carried." We may look forward, no doubt, to a spirited debate.
It seems clear, however, that even were Berger's thesis as to the
original understanding accepted, the controversy over the conclusions
he draws as to the impropriety of Supreme Court decisions would not
be resolved. Lurking beneath the historical argument is a more serious difference over the weight which ought to be accorded the intention of the framers in constitutional adjudication. In the second part
of his book Berger argues that judicial adherence to this original
understanding is required for a number of reasons, including a contention that such adherence is vital to a government where power is
delegated and limited by a constitution.' 2 I believe that it is in forcing us to face this issue that Berger has made his most important
contribution.
10. I find two matters particularly troubling. First, if the framers merely intended to
put in constitutional form the specific rights secured in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
why did they cast aside the technique of enumeration for the grand and unspecific
language of the amendment? Berger presents little direct testimony from the framers on
this point and his explanation that there was an inclination to avoid detail and prolixity
in a constitution is not entirely convincing. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 38-39, 110-14.
Second, even if this were their subjective intention, are legislators able to limit broad
language to intended narrow applications? Berger is certain, and cites authority for the
proposition, that legislative intention controls even entirely inapposite expression. Id. at
7-8 & n.24. While this is, no doubt, a widely accepted idea, another traditional strain in
interpretation requires the Court to look primarily to the expressed intent of the lawmakers, that is, the language of the law itself. This view is summarized in the aphorism
of Mr. Justice Holmes: "We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means." Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv.
417, 419 (1899). This view has been adopted frequently by courts in the process of
applying statutes. See S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1972);
United States v. Great N.R.R., 343 U.S. 562, 575 (1952); People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d
175, 180-84, 217 P.2d 1, 4-6 (1950) (Traynor, J.). But see Commissioner v. Acker, 361
U.S. 87, 95 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Our problem is not what do ordinary
English words mean but what did Congress mean them to mean.") Such an "objective"
interpretation of a constitutional amendment would not, I think, be at odds with the
stability and certainty requisite to constitutionalism. See notes 16-20 and accompanying
text infra.
11. These are values which Berger shares. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 4, 407. While
he is certainly convinced of his argument, it is not hard to imagine that he may share
the hope that his historical analysis be proven faulty.
12. "Respect for the limits on power are the essence of a democratic society; without
it the entire democratic structure is undermined and the way is paved from Weimar to
Hitler." Id. at 410.
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It is not at all an easy question. The proposition that we ought to
govern ourselves in the manner thought proper by the majority of a

group of prosperous merchants, planters, and lawyers in 1787 or 1868
seems absurd on its face. Indeed, the fashion has grown in our generation of scoffing at the "filiopietistic" notion that we must be

restrained by "the dead hand of the past."'13 As mentioned, Berger
contests this position. He does so by accumulating a number of refer-

ences and contentions based on history, political theory, and jurisprudence. I believe the same result can be reached in a more spare

and logical argument.
The issue can be illustrated most clearly by a rather far-fetched
example. Suppose Congress decides, as has often been suggested,

that members of the House of Representatives ought to be elected for
a four-year term and passes legislation to that effect. What is the duty
of the Supreme Court when presented with a proper case challenging

that legislation as inconsistent with Article I, Section 2? Even the
defender of the most "modern" approach to constitutional construction would find this an easy case. 14 But would we not in this

case be just as much ruled by the framers from their graves?'- Just
what is it about a result which so clearly ignores the constitutional
text that we find disturbing? And, assuming that a conflict exists, is
there any reason for distinguishing the easily understood passages
from the more obscure ones?
13. The literature to this effect is enormous. Berger cites and contends with much of
it. The characterizations quoted in the text are respectively from Miller & Howell, The
Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 661, 683 (1960)
and JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 143 (L. Levy ed. 1967), quoted in R.
BERGER, supra note 5, at 314. For a recent and particularly unabashed exposition of this
view see Antieau, The Jurisprudence of Interests As a Method of Constitutional Adjudication, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1977). One of the most thoughtful recent
presentations is Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975).
14. See Miller & Howell, supra note 13, at 683.
15. JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 13, at 143, quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 5, at
314. One explanation put forward by the late Professor Bickel distinguished between
the broad clauses limiting government in regard to regulation of individual conductthe "open texture" constitution-and the "mechanics of institutional arrangements and
of the political process, of power allocation and the division of powers, and the historically defined hard core of procedural provisions found chiefly in the Bill of Rights"
which comprise the "manifest constitution." With the latter there is an "absolute duty to
obey" whereas under the former the Court is to explicate (albeit in a disciplined and
rational process) principles nowhere written down. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 25-30 (1975). The distinction seems to me unsatisfying not least of all because I
find it impossible to divide constitutional provisions neatly into these two categories.
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To answer the first question requires an elementary restatement
of the reasons for a written constitution. Constitutionalism assumes

the desirability of a limited government, that there are boundaries
beyond which governmental acts are improper. This presupposes the

articulation and preservation of knowable, stable, limiting rules. 16
Effective limits on government cannot be subject to unpredictable
change. If I request you to behave according to rules 1, 2, and 3 but
conceal the content of those rules until you transgress them, I cannot
hope to influence your conduct to conform to the model I have in
mind. Limited government requires that at a particular point in his-

tory the limits are decided upon and that the), remain relatively fixed.
At the least, change in the limits must be prospective. It was this
idea which caused the founders of the government to insist with such

emphasis on afixed constitution as the surest security of liberty.' 7
Since even known rules are not always self-executing, however,
the effectiveness of constitutional limits also depends on the existence
of an authority which will announce when the limits are passed.
Under our system the Supreme Court has been charged with the

responsibility of "policing the boundaries"'

8

of legitimate government

activity by reference to the constitutional limits. To the extent the

Court ignores those preexisting limits and judges the acts of government by other criteria, chosen ad hoc by the justices, the limits on

government are as ineffective as the undisclosed rules numbered
and 3. To implement real limits on government the judges must
reference to standards which are external to, and prior to, the
ter to be decided.' 9 This is necessarily historical investigation.

1, 2,
have
matThe

16. Therefore "natural Iav" in its various formats and formulae Ias never attained
the precision and permanence to make it a meaningful governmental limit. A famous
statement of this defect is the opinion of Justice Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 398 (1798). See R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 251.
17. See R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 290, 363-66; F. HAYEK, THE CONS TrTUO. OF
LIBERTY 177-78 (1960). For any state, the promulgation of these limits on government
may take place in a number of ways-by revelation, by charter from a superior authority,
or by some form of broad political agreement. The United States Government, of course,
is the product of the last. Stability is further assured by requiring that alterations in the
limits may be effected only in the manner specified in advance in the constitutional
rules-in our case by the difficult and consensus-assuring process of amendment. See id.
at 180-83.
18. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 362.
19. The starting point of an elucidation of constitutional clauses as norns for
government, not only for judges, must be that it involves an exposition of the
Constitution . . . [C]onstitutional rules are applications of prior political lawmaking. They reflect a series of decisions concerning the organization of gov-
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content of those standards are set at their creation. Recourse to "the intention of the framers" in judicial review, therefore, can be understood 20as indispensible to realizing the idea of government limited by law.

Now this may all be very well when the limits of government
previously decided upon are more or less clear, as in the case of
two-year terms for the members of the House of Representatives.
What about the case where the framers did not express themselves
with such precision? The classic case in point is the fourteenth
amendment which prohibits the states from denying "the equal protection of the laws" or depriving people "of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." Berger, it must be stressed, denies the
existence of any vagueness in the intended meaning of these phrases
when the historical record is examined.21 This contrasts with the
views of courts and scholars who have regarded these clauses as the
"majestic generalities" of constitutional law. 22 Assuming Berger is
mistaken and the historical meaning of such phrases is, in fact,
obscure, are not the courts then entitled to give to them a meaning
which is in keeping with their view of correct policy? This seems to
me to involve a serious non sequitur. It may be that there is
no obvious correct answer to a question of constitutional interpretation. But this does not provide a license for abandoning the task
of interpretation altogether. Because a phrase may have no clear
meaning does not indicate that it has no meaning at all.23 The idea of
constitutionally limited government which I have outlined seems to
call for the Court to do the best it can in determining constitutional
ernment, its powers and limitations that were nade by particular men at particular moments in history.
Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 253-54 (1972). This
is an outstanding discussion of the application of the idea of constitutional law as a limit
on government to current fashions in constitutional adjudication and jurisprudence.
20. Adjudication without reference to prior constitutional limits not only fails in its
essential role of guarding the boundaries created by the Constitution, but is itself a
transgression of the limits defining the power of the judiciary. Hamilton was adamant In
asserting that the judges "must declare the sense of the law" and denied that they
would inevitably "exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT." See THE FEDERALIST No.
78 (A. Hamilton). The restricted nature of the judicial power created by the Constitution
is examined by Berger. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 290-93, 300-11.
21. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 258.
22. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966), quoted in id. at 166.
23. Moreover, ifa constitutional provision were so vague as to seem to place no limit
on government at all, I believe the natural conclusion would be that the legislature was
free to formulate any policy it chose. It does not at all follow that the Court is given a
veto by such clauses.
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meaning, having reference to such historical evidence as exists and to
the logic of the rest of the Constitution. Some answers will be more
clearly correct or incorrect than others. If the Court does this, we
may be free to criticize the Court's results, but we would be unjustified in questioning the legitimacy of its enterprise. To throw over
the attempt altogether, however, subjects the Court to valid charges
of infidelity to the scheme of constitutional government.
It will, no doubt, be noted that one possibility exists which
would reconcile the application of shifting constitutional rules with
the notion of limited constitutional government put forward here.
This is the suggestion that the framers of the fourteenth amendment
(and of other broad constitutional provisions) intended that these
clauses have no fixed meaning but that they should be construed differently to meet the needs of different times. This view has been put
forward by many writers, often citing the famous dictum of Chief
Justice Marshall in M'Culloch v. Maryland2 4 that "we must never
forget that it is a constitution we are expounding," a constitution "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs."' 5 In this view certain constitutional phrases were in Justice Frankfurter's words "purposely left to
gather meaning from experience." 26 In this way Court-imposed policy
is blessed with the sanction of the framers.
There are two ways in which this notion can be understood.
First, we may believe that the framers had specific objections to government behavior of a certain kind and that they intended this behavior to be forbidden in the instances they were aware of as well as
those they could not foresee. 2 7 The fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure could be viewed in this sense
to have been "intended" to apply to electronic surveillance of telephone conversations, not because this is similar in some way to an
24. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
25. Id. at 407, 415. Berger contends that the expansive interpretations of these
phrases are not representative of Marshall's philosophy of constitutional adjudication.
See R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 373-79.
26. National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), quoted in id. at 193. The extent to which the Constitution embodies this
view was the subject of the debate between the majority opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes and the dissent of Justice Sutherland in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
27. Thomas Grey has classified adherents of this manner of extrapolation as followers of "the pure interpretive model." See Grey, supra note 13, at 705-06 & n.9. The
position is well articulated in Linde, supra note 19, at 254-55.
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"unreasonable search and seizure," but because it is an unreasonable
search and seizure albeit one about which the framers could not have
known. 28 So long as constitutional adjudication rests on this process of
inference it cannot be objected to on the grounds of lack of adherence
to original intent.
Second, we may view the nonspecific clauses of the Constitution
as no more than identifications of broad moral values, respect for
which is required of the government in a manner determined by the
Supreme Court to be appropriate at any given time without reference
to the specific views of the framers. We are provided with concepts
such as privacy, equality, and contract and the Court is to explicate
and enforce what it takes to be the proper specific applications of
29
these concepts.
It is important to see exactly what this position entails. To the
extent the framers intended merely to identify broad values, they
were leaving the power of the government largely undefined. This
would be out of keeping with the idea of limitation by a fixed constitution, which I have argued animates the constitutional enterprise.
To be sure, constitutionalism does not require that each and every
governmental act be specified beforehand or that every prohibition be
spelled out in detail. But the substitution of broad concepts for at
least minimally defined proscriptions would justify a vast array of possibly inconsistent decisions. This is a giant step away from the idea of
constitutional government I have outlined. It is difficult to attribute
such an intention to framers committed to the rule of law.
In addition, it assumes that the high degree of flexibility which
was purposely built into the Constitution was to be entrusted principally to the judiciary. There is no reason to think the courts would
have been granted such a drastic revising power. Indeed, Berger pre28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The stirring dissent of Justice
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-79 (1928), reaching the same
conclusion, takes perhaps too broad a view of the impact of the fourth amendment and
might be read as a prohibition against every possible governmental interference with
"privacy." Justice Black's dissent in Katz, on the other hand, gives an unduly narrow
construction to words perfectly capable of accommodating changing content. 389 U.S. at
364.
29. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-37 (1976). There is some indication that Dworkin's position may be somewhat narrower and closer to the view discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 27-28. See id. at 136 n.1. My reading of
Dworkin, however, leads me to believe he is more properly seen as a proponent of this
more expansive model. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-Catchers, 1975 TImEs
LIT. SuPP. 1437.
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sents evidence to the contrary, recounting the rejection by the Constitutional Convention of the Council of Revision, and documenting
the framers' preference for a strictly limited judicial power. 3 0
Faithfulness by a government (including its judiciary) to prior
constitutional limits does not come without cost. It is inevitable that
in some respects constitutional arrangements made at one time will
become inadequate at a later time. To the extent constitutional
amendment is difficult or impossible, the government will be disabled
from doing what may urgently need to be done, or empowered to do
what seems intolerable. If Berger's view of the meaning of the fourteenth amendment is correct, the cost of constitutional government
would be dramatically and tragically illustrated in the perpetuation of
racial segregation and discrimination in significant fields of government activity. But the acceptance of government limited by law is
premised on the faith that in the long run the evil which is prevented
is greater than the good which is denied or deferred. 3 1 Our distress
at the possibility of losing decisions like those striking down racial
discrimination and malapportionment should perhaps be balanced by
the recollection of less attractive periods of judicial policymaking.
Viewed in context, the activism of the Warren Court era appears to
be only a brief interruption in an activism which may have far less
appeal. Indeed the history of constitutional adjudication presents
striking examples of the dangers of governmental power unlimited by
law. Taken as a whole, it should give pause to those who would be
content to leave the courts "discretion to roam in the trackless field of
their own imaginations." 32
Still it may be that the Constitution which exists at a certain time
is so unsatisfactory, and the prospects for amendment so dim, that we
may feel a judge is justified in substituting what seems to him or her
some superior standard of governmental morality for that which may
30. R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 300-11. I do not mean to suggest that vesting an
undefined veto power in the judiciary does not serve to limit government action. Naturally as power is dispersed its exercise becomes more difficult. It does not, however,
forward the special values of government limited by law which requires that limiting
rules have some minimum level of stability and certainty. See text accompanying notes
16-20 supra.

31. See Kay, Book Review, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 219 (1977).
KN-, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 373 (9th ed. 1858), quoted in R.
supra note 5, at 308. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 1 cite
Lochner only because it has come to symbolize judicial overreaching. I could, no doubt,
list a long series of cases of different eras on different subject matters, three-quarters of
which would be branded judicial usurpation by almost everyone although few might
designate exactly the same three-quarters.

32. 1 J.

BERGER,
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be fairly attributed to the Constitution. It may even be argued that
we have reached such a point today. 33 That we may find such an
action proper in a moral or political sense, however, ought not to
blind us to the fact that it is in contradiction with and subversive of
the design of constitutional government to which we purport to
adhere. 34 We should be cognizant of the risks such a course of decision creates. This does not mean that those who would approve the
exercise of this power in some cases are disqualified from ever
criticizing its use in others. But the grounds for criticism must then
be the policy bases of such decisions. It will not do to condemn the
Court for overstepping its legitimate function of constitutional interpretation only when the results are somehow displeasing. That
kind of criticism, as Raoul Berger has shown, is a two-edged sword.
33. See, e.g., the "parade of horribles" which would ensue from fidelity to the constitutional text put forward in Grey, supra note 13, at 710-14.
34. The Supreme Court has always professed an allegiance to the commands of the
constitutional text. See, R. BERGER, supra note 5, at 367-68. But cf. Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). ("Notions of what constitutes equal treatment
for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change.")

